Marianne O’Brien
What is Freedom and Why it is of Value
The aim of my paper is to elucidate the concept of freedom and to determine why it is deemed to be valuable by examining quite distinct accounts of the concept provided by Isaiah Berlin and Gerald MacCallum. I begin this paper with a brief examination of the distinction Isaiah Berlin has drawn between negative and positive liberty and I assess the merits and weaknesses of Berlin’s account. Then I examine whether the weaknesses of Berlin’s account require us to invoke an alternative conception of freedom, specifically that proposed by Gerald MacCallum. Thirdly, I consider the effectiveness of Berlin’s responses to MacCallum’s objections; a comparative analysis of both positions will aid me in the development of my own thesis. This thesis will be outlined in the conclusion where I shall argue that negative freedom is a prerequisite of positive freedom, that both ‘concepts’ are actually two sides of the same coin, the concept of freedom being unintelligible in the absence of either feature. Finally, I shall argue in light of the previous discussion, that although freedom is instrumentally valuable it also involves a non-instrumental (option) value; I shall maintain that how we assess and value freedom will involve a measure of both.